The Capitol, Washington, D.C., United States of America
Can peace be maintained on our small, troubled planet, in spite of the alarming proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among many countries that can use them as they please?
Some people thought so. Among them, the inventor of dynamite, in 1870, was convinced that their destructive power would make war disappear in the face of the risk of total mutual destruction.
Although he did not name it, Alfred Nobel preached the "balance of terror".
Since then, the Industrial Revolution has multiplied this destructive power ad infinitum. And since the end of the Second World War, we have been living in this diabolical balance. In recent years, it is the speed of missiles, up to 20 times the speed of sound, that contributes to making these weapons impossible to defeat.
One might think that most humans, if they had the political power, would have the good sense to avoid self-annihilation using such weapons. But this majority is never decision-makers. It is often very lonely and violent individuals who run countries.
The power of weapons does not seem to be enough of a deterrent to prevent some of them from setting the world alight.
Such is the case of Vladimir Putin, who uses the most barbarous violence in Ukraine to impose his will, even at the risk of triggering a worldwide nuclear war.
And, as we have also seen in a previous post, the path to the pinnacle of political leadership in their countries does not have the required complete imperviousness to stand in the way of this sort of autocrat. Even the United States and its constitution, over two centuries old, may not be able to resist the rise of a dictator indefinitely.
What then remains to avoid the worst? There remains the worldwide control and reduction of the weapons of war.
The control of weapons of war in the hands of a central government has been the path taken by most countries at the time of their establishment, with the legitimate objective of defending their borders from external aggressors.
Moreover, there is another equally important purpose for such centralization in a country: the maintenance of domestic order, to cope with all the pressures of the often hostile and belligerent human groups that make up society. Although the weapons used by these "forces of order" called "police" are usually not as powerful as "weapons of war," they are powerful enough to subjugate a country's population, if this force is backed up by strong institutions that ensure that it cannot be misused by unscrupulous autocrats. Otherwise, domestic freedom may disappear, as is unfortunately the case in many countries. But that is another debate.
But let us return to the objective of extending the control of weapons of war to the whole world. It is generally believed that this is Utopia, that mankind will never succeed. But it seems to be the only way to achieve genuine and lasting peace on this small, fragile and irreplaceable planet.
The main problem of peacekeeping lies in this important scattering of weapons, ever more powerful and sophisticated, between countries that are in conflict with each other ideologically.
Russia and China are autocracies; the United Kingdom, France and the United States are democracies. All five are members of the United Nations Security Council and have veto power, the exercise of which often paralyzes that institution. Finally, all five and a few other world powers possess a nuclear arsenal capable of wiping out all life on earth.
UN Resolutions often fall on deaf ears as the UN has no power to enforce its authority on these heavily armed countries.
Nevertheless, to this day, many countries, especially the most powerful, refuse to delegate these powers to a central body, for fear of losing their illusory ascendancy over the world; even if it is difficult to imagine any other means of stopping the territorial, economic, religious or ethnic conquest ambitions of some of them.
It must be recognized that such a transfer would pose the problem of the control of this central body, which must not be vulnerable to a takeover by a super-autocrat. This is a fear that is unfortunately entirely well founded.
As for arms reduction, let us recall the important agreement on nuclear weapons between the United States and the USSR during the presidency of Ronald Reagan and USSR General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s. If it was possible then, it must remain possible now.
Despite many failures, the history of disarmament forums is punctuated by some noteworthy successes.
These include the Protocol on Incendiary Weapons (1980); the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968); the Biological Weapons Convention (1972); the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993); the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1996); the Blinding Weapons Treaty (1995); the Anti-Personnel Mine Convention (1997);[i] and the launch of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons in April 2007. In 2014, 146 countries participated in the International Conference on Disarmament.
So it appears possible to progress down this path progressively. The same arguments used in the days of Reagan and Gorbachev are applicable: since none of these countries wants to be the first to resort to nuclear weapons, there is no need to acquire them, or at least as many of them. It is therefore a matter of agreeing, as was then the case, on a gradual, balanced reduction, verifiable by all parties, to the lowest possible level, or even to their total elimination.
A formal conference on disarmament was established by the UN in 1979. It has 65 member states. But decisions are taken on the basis of consensus, which, of course, cripples its functioning. The objective of eliminating threats to peace is constantly in conflict with the principle of national sovereignty provided for in Article 2.7. This is why NGOs (non-governmental organizations), often disappointed with the paralysis of the political authorities, have become disarmament drivers themselves. [ii]
If this centralization and unity, seen by many as utopian, cannot be achieved, could defensive military alliances be the way to achieve this peacekeeping?
The history of NATO speaks for itself when it comes to a defensive military alliance. Created at the beginning of the Cold War to prevent the USSR from slowly but surely carving up Western Europe, it has grown from 11 countries to 30 today, and will soon grow to 32. It has proven to be an effective barrier against any aggression from the USSR, as clause 5 stipulates that an attack on one member is an attack on all members. Today, NATO can be an effective defence against further aggression by any country.
Moreover, though not spelled out explicitly, it seems quite improbable that two countries belonging to this alliance would attack each other, even though their political systems may sometimes differ significantly. In the past, NATO has had autocracies in its ranks that have undermined the freedoms of their own citizens, without posing a risk of aggression against other members.
This was the case at one time with Portugal and Greece, which only joined the ranks of democracies much later, but, in the meantime, were active members of NATO. This situation, although not ideal, achieves the main objective: the member countries do not attack each other and are prepared to defend themselves jointly against any foreign aggression.
The appeal of such a defensive alliance is not to be denied today.
This kind of alliance could expand so much that the goal of uniting the world under one defensive umbrella and, if necessary, reducing both the quantity and spread of weapons of war could be reached.
Those who believe that the United Nations can still be reworked and who are working hard to do so deserve our support; but let us not scorn the possibility of a promising alternative. Without replacing the UN and its Security Council, an enlarged defensive alliance could become more like the world's peacemaking reference.
However, it should be emphasized that the unanimity requirement for new NATO membership would have to be eliminated to prevent blockages like those experienced by the UN.
The aberration of this requirement is illustrated by Turkey, currently opposing the membership of Finland and Sweden in NATO. These two countries are strong democracies concerned about Russia's hostility and should be accepted with open arms in this organization.
Such unanimity does not have to be replaced by a simple majority rule. There is no objection to requiring, conservatively, a high percentage of members (e.g., 75%), provided that it eliminates the possibility of blackmail by any one of them.
It should be remembered that there are more than 80 democracies in the world, most of which could be interested in joining a defensive alliance for the very same reasons that Finland and Sweden are doing so today: to ensure the support of a military alliance whose power exceeds anything known to humanity in the course of its history, in order to avoid being attacked by another country.
Thus, the current "balance of terror" with an overwhelming, but only defensive, military force would be replaced by the "imbalance of pacification."
The autocracies would probably remain outside this defensive group. These countries, it should be remembered, are the haven of criminals of all kinds, for whom the freedom of the people represents a threat to their domination and their outrageous personal wealth. But even grouped together, they would be reluctant to break the peace against such an alliance.
Thus, by preventing free countries from slipping back into the hands of dictators, and by facilitating the emergence of greater freedom in dictatorships, we should one of these days bring about the peaceful world that we have all been calling for.
[i] Landmines kill or injure anyone who has the misfortune to step on them. That is why the international community adopted a convention in 1997 to ban them, banning their use, production, stockpiling and transfer, and requiring that specific measures be taken to prevent and treat their long-term effects. This ban has so far been approved by three quarters of the world's countries.
[ii] In "International and Strategic Review" (2014/4 no. 96, pages 123 to 131)
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